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FOURTH AMENDMENT-THE PLAIN
TOUCH EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,' the United States Supreme Court
unanimously adopted the plain touch doctrine, thereby allowing of-
ficers to seize evidence recognized through the sense of touch dur-
ing a lawful patdown without a warrant. Analogizing to the plain
view doctrine developed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire2 and its prog-
eny, Justice White's opinion held plain touch seizures constitutional
when three conditions are met: (1) a lawful patdown has occurred
under Terry v. Ohio,3 (2) the character of the item as contraband or
evidence of a crime is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a
lawful right of access to the item.4
The Supreme Court held that officers must stop examining an
object as soon as they are satisfied that the item is not a weapon. At
that point, it is impermissible for officers to further examine the
item in order to determine if it is some other contraband.5 In the
case at bar, Justice White found that the officer exceeded the
bounds of Terry by continuing to examine the object when it was
clear that it was not a weapon.6 Consequently, the Court affirmed
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to reverse the conviction.7
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, concluded that Terry was in-
correct in holding that a protective patdown is constitutional, be-
cause patdowns were not an accepted part of police procedure when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.8 Nevertheless, he concurred
in the decision because the constitutionality of the patdown in the
1 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
2 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
3 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37.
5 Id. at 2139.
6 Id. at 2138-39.
7 Id. at 2139.
8 Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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instant case was not challenged. 9
In a separate opinion, ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined in the ma-
jority opinion with respect to the establishment of the plain touch
doctrine.10 He dissented, however, with respect to the treatment of
the instant case. Because the findings of fact were imprecise about
the extent to which the officer examined the object in Respondent's
pocket, the Chief Justice would have remanded the case. 1
This Note examines the Court's treatment of the plain view
doctrine and concludes that the Court properly held that the plain
touch doctrine is analogous to the plain view doctrine. This Note
argues, however, that the Court provided a vague outline of the re-
quirements of this newly recognized exception to the warrant re-
quirement. The Court wavered between two different standards of
certainty, referring to both "probable cause" and "immediately ap-
parent." This Note argues that probable cause is the proper stan-
dard of certainty. Additionally, the Court required that the officer
have lawful access to the object before seizing it, without explaining
how this requirement functions in the plain touch context. 12
This Note further argues that the Court improperly upheld the
lower court's reversal. Relying on a misquote of the trial transcript,
the Court determined that the officer in the instant case overstepped
the boundaries of Terry. 13 The Court should have satisfied any
doubt about the scope of the search by remanding the case for fur-
ther proceedings, as Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested in his sepa-
rate opinion. 14 This Note contends, however, that a proper
application of the plain touch doctrine did permit seizure in the in-
stant case.
II. UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits only "unreasonable" searches.' 5 It is a well established rule
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specially established and well-deline-
9 Id. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
iO Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 Id. at 2137.
13 Id. at 2138-39.
14 Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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ated exceptions."' 16 This warrant requirement is primarily based on
the premise that a neutral and detached magistrate is a better judge
of probable cause than the officer or prosecutor who is actively in-
volved in a specific case.' 7
These considerations led the Court to conclude in Weeks v.
United States' that evidence seized by federal officers without a war-
rant may not be introduced as evidence in a federal trial.' 9 This
ruling became known as the exclusionary rule, and has been ex-
tended to state trials.20 The exclusionary rule works with the war-
rant requirement to forbid the use of evidence obtained without a
search warrant in a criminal trial.
Numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement exist.2 1 One
such exception was developed by the Court in Terry v. Ohio,22 which
held that a police officer may conduct a protective patdown search
for weapons of a suspect's outer clothes based on a reasonable sus-
picion that the suspect has been engaged in, or is in the process of
engaging in, criminal activity and may be armed. 23 Less than prob-
able cause is sufficient to validate this warrantless search, as long as
the officers conducting the search reasonably believe that their
safety, or the safety of others, is injeopardy.2 4 The Court noted that
due weight must be given to the specific inferences that an officer is
entitled to draw based upon the specific facts of a situation and
based on his training and experience. 25 Evidence may not be intro-
duced if discovered through a search that is not reasonably limited
in scope to the original justification for the search, namely the pro-
tective search for weapons.2 6
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted).
17 In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, n.3 (1948), the Court determined
that close involvement in the competitive enterprise of law enforcement is incompatible
with neutral determinations of probable cause because officers must act quickly under
the "excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime" without the op-
portunity to weigh and consider whether a given search or seizure is permissible under
the Constitution. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18 232 U.S. 383 (1917).
19 Id. at 398.
20 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing a warrantless
search incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (authorizing a war-
rantless search following hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (al-
lowing search in the face of exigent circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (establishing an exception to the warrant requirement for motor vehicles).
22 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
23 Id. at 27.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 29.
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Another relevant exception to the warrant requirement is the
plain view doctrine, expounded in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.2 7 The
Court held in Coolidge that police may seize evidence discovered in
plain view without a warrant specifying the item(s) in certain circum-
stances.28 The Court delineated three requirements for a seizure to
be valid under the plain view doctrine: (1) the initial intrusion must
be justified by either a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant
requirement; (2) the incriminating character of the object must be
immediately apparent; and (3) the discovery of the object must be
inadvertent. 29
The first requirement of the plain view doctrine is that the ini-
tial intrusion be justified by either a warrant, or some valid excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit, search incident
to arrest, or a protective search under Terry.30 The Court found that
it would be a "needless inconvenience," and potentially dangerous
to both the evidence and the officer, to require officers to leave evi-
dence in order to obtain a warrant in these circumstances.3 1
The second element of the plain view doctrine as delineated in
Coolidge requires that the nature of the object as contraband or evi-
dence of a crime be "immediately apparent" to the police.a 2 How-
ever, later in the opinion, the Court commented that
"[i]ncontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating ob-
ject is on the premises belonging to a criminal suspect may provide
the fullest measure of probable cause."33 This decision was not clear
about which standard of certainty is required to justify seizure under
the plain view doctrine, since the phrase "immediately apparent"
indicates a higher degree of certainty than is required by probable
cause.
34
The Court clarified the second element of the plain view doc-
trine in Texas v. Brown.3 5 The plurality commented on the ambigu-
ous nature of the phrase "immediately apparent":
[d]ecisions by this Court since Coolidge indicate that the use of the
phrase 'immediately apparent' was very likely an unhappy choice of
27 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
28 Id. at 465.
29 Id. at 467.
30 Id. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Court upheld the seizure of
evidence in plain view from a car when the initial intrusion was justified under Terry. See
also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
31 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
32 Id. at 466.
33 Id. at 468 (emphasis added).




words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence is necessary for
an application of the plain view doctrine.36
Probable cause is flexible, and merely requires that the facts avail-
able to the officer at the time of the seizure be sufficient to "warrant
a man of reasonable caution" to believe that an item is contraband
or evidence of a crime. 37 The Court held that probable cause is suf-
ficient to justify a seizure under the plain view doctrine.38
Likewise, in Arizona v. Hicks39 a majority of the Court reaffirmed
that probable cause is sufficient to invoke the plain view doctrine.40
The Court determined that if probable cause is satisfied, officers
may seize evidence of crime or contraband in plain view or conduct a
further search of that material.4 1 The majority remarked that it
would be "absurd" to permit seizure of an object but not -allow
closer examination of that object before seizure.42 Because the state
conceded in Hicks that it did not have probable cause to conduct a
further search, the officer's act of moving a stereo to read the serial
number was an impermissible further search.4 3
The third and final requirement of the plain view doctrine, as
originally delineated by the Coolidge plurality, was that the discovery
of evidence be inadvertent.44 The Court determined that if the po-
lice expect in advance to find and seize some piece of evidence,
there is no inconvenience involved in obtaining a warrant for that
particular piece of evidence, and thus no valid reason for not fulfil-
ling the warrant requirement. 45 However, the inadvertence require-
ment was overruled in Horton v. California.4 6 The Horton Court
concluded that, although inadvertence is usually a characteristic of
plain view seizures, it is not a requirement.47 The Horton Court de-
termined that even-handed law enforcement is best promoted by us-
ing objective standards to judge an officer's conduct, rather than
36 Id. at 741.
37 Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
38 Id. at 742.
39 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
40 Id. at 326.
41 Id.
42 Id. In Hicks an officer conducting a lawful search saw a stereo system that he sus-
pected was stolen. Id. at 323. He moved the stereo to see the serial number, which the
Court considered a "further search." Id. at 324-25.
43 Id. at 326-28. The Court again reaffirmed that probable cause is sufficient to sat-
isfy the plain view doctrine in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
44 Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971).
45 Id. at 470.
46 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
47 Id. at 130.
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relying on his or her subjective state of mind.48
The Horton Court added a new requirement to the plain view
doctrine. It held that an officer must have lawful access to the object
for seizure to be permissible under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement. 49 The Court did not discuss the purpose or
function of this additional requirement. The only guidance the
Court provided was a brief, footnoted reference to some pre-Coo-
lidge cases, all of which held evidence inadmissible when officers
committed trespass in order to seize the evidence. 50
While the plain view cases all involved visual perception of in-
criminating evidence, many have contained language referring to
the use of other senses. For example, in Coolidge, the Court com-
mented that "[i]ncontrovertible testimony of the senses .. .may es-
tablish the fullest possible measure of probable cause."5 1 Based on
such language, a number of lower courts have allowed the seizure of
evidence based upon the officer's sense of touch.52 There is no gen-
eral consensus among the courts that have accepted the plain touch
doctrine as to what the requirements of this exception should be. In
State v. Richardson,53 an officer discovered illegal drugs while con-
ducting a lawful protective patdown. 54 The court held that the of-
ficer's tactile sensation during the patdown, combined with the
surrounding circumstances, provided the officer with probable
cause to search the contents of the suspect's pocket. 55 By contrast,
48 Id. at 138.
49 Id. at 137.
50 Id. at 137 n.7 (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v.
United States 357 U.S. 493 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 10 (1948);
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
51 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (emphasis added). See also
Horton, 496 U.S. at 137; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85 (1979).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Payton, No. 91-3061, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6195 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 27, 1992); United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d
1065 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Diaz, 577 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1978); Jackson v. State, 804
S.W.2d 735 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96 (Cal. 1983); People v.
Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1989); Dickerson v. State, No. 228, 1992, 1993 Del.
LEXIS 12 (Del. Jan. 26, 1993); Walker v. State, 610 A.2d 728 (Del. 1992); Doctor v.
Florida, 596 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1992); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822 (Haw. 1984); State v.
Lee, 520 So. 2d 1229 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Vanacker, 759 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992).
53 456 N.W.2d 830 (Wis. 1990).
54 Id. at 144.
55 Id. at 146. See also State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992); People v. Lee, 240
Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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the court in United States v. Williams56 required the higher "reason-
able certainty" standard rather than probable cause.57 Other courts
have accepted the doctrine without any discussion of what level of
certainty an officer must satisfy in order to uphold the seizure. 58
Still other courts have explicitly rejected the extension of the plain
view doctrine to tactile sensation. 59 The Supreme Court attempted
to resolve this conflict in Minnesota v. Dickerson.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of November 9, 1989, Officer Vernon Rose and
his partner were conducting a routine patrol of the area around 10th
Avenue and Morgan Avenue North in Minneapolis, Minnesota in a
marked squad car.60 They observed Timothy Dickerson exit
through the front door of 1030 Morgan Avenue shortly after 8
p.m. 61 Dickerson walked towards the officers until he noticed the
squad car and made eye contact with one of the officers. 6 2 At this
point, Dickerson abruptly turned around and began walking down
an alley located beside the building he had just left. 65
Dickerson's seemingly evasive behavior upon his exit from a
building commonly known to be a crackhouse aroused the officers'
suspicions. 64 They drove into the alley and ordered Dickerson to
56 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
57 Id. at 1184-85. See also Dickerson v. State, 1993 Del. LEXIS 12 (Del. Jan. 26,
1993).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16440 (N.D. Il. 1992);
People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); McDan-
iel v. State, 555 So. 2d 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982).
60 Transcript of Proceedings at 6, State v. Dickerson, No. 89067687 (Hennepin
County, Minn. Feb. 20, 1990), rev'd, 469 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 481
N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1991), afd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) [hereinafter Record]. The au-
thor is grateful to Assistant District Attorney Beverly Wolfe of the Hennepin County
District Attorney's Office for providing her with pertinent parts of the trial transcript.
This information is also available in the reported decisions.
When this case went to trial, Officer Rose was a fourteen year veteran of the Minne-
apolis Police Department, and in recent years had participated in the execution of 75
drug related search warrants, resulting in 50-75 arrests. A number of these searches
occurred at 1030 Morgan Avenue, a notorious 24 hour-a-day crackhouse, and resulted
in the seizure of both drugs and weapons. Police were monitoring this building due to
complaints of drug sales in the hallways. Record at 4-7.
61 Id. at 8.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (Officer Rose testified, "I thought it was strange and suspicious that the party
would change his direction just because he saw a police car").
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stop.65 Officer Rose then conducted a protective patdown of the
outer surfaces of Dickerson's clothing.66 This search uncovered no
weapons, but Officer Rose detected a small lump in Dickerson's thin
nylon jacket pocket that felt like it was wrapped in cellophane. 67
Based on his experience in law enforcement, Officer Rose deter-
mined that the lump was crack cocaine.6 8
Officer Rose then removed the object from Dickerson's pocket
and arrested him.69 Later testing revealed that the object was in fact
.20 grams of cocaine. 70 Dickerson was charged in Hennepin County
with possession of a controlled substance. 7' He moved to suppress
the cocaine, but the trial court allowed it to be admitted into evi-
dence. 72 The trial court first reasoned that the stop and frisk were
justified under Terry v. Ohio.73 In a memorandum, the court then
justified the seizure under the "plain feel" exception by drawing an
analogy to the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement, which allows contraband observed in plain view
to be searched further or seized without a warrant. 74 Thus, the
court concluded that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment and Dickerson was found guilty of possession of cocaine. 75
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction. 76 The appellate court agreed that both the stop and the
protective patdown were justified.77 However, the court held that
Officer Rose's actions exceeded the constitutional limitations out-
lined in Terry v. Ohio.78 Refusing to accept the plain touch excep-
tion, the court held that an object may only be seized during a
protective patdown if it reasonably resembles a weapon. 79






71 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1993).
72 State v. Dickerson, No. 89067687 (Hennepin County, Minn. March 6, 1990) (find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and order, and memorandum), rev'd, 469 N.W.2d 462
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aJfd, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1991), af'd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993)
[hereinafter Trial Court Findings] (available in Appendix C of the Petition For A Writ of
Certiorari, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019)).
73 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a limited
patdown search for weapons is permissible in order to protect officers)).
74 Trial Court Findings, Dickerson.
75 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
76 State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
77 Id. at 465.
78 Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
79 Id. at 466.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals, refusing to accept the plain touch doctrine as a
corollary to the plain view doctrine on the grounds that tactile sen-
sations are less immediate and reliable than visual sensations, and
necessarily more intrusive.80 The court commented in a footnote
that even if it were to recognize a plain feel exception, an officer
must stop examining an object upon determining that it is not a
weapon."' The court noted that the search of Dickerson's pocket
would not qualify under this criteria, because the testimony indi-
cated that Officer Rose manipulated the object in Dickerson's
pocket after determining that it was not a weapon. 812
The United States Supreme Court granted Minnesota's petition
for a writ of certiorari83 to consider whether Officer Rose's seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice White,84 the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.85 The
Court held that contraband detected through the sense of touch
during a lawful patdown search may be admitted into evidence,. so
long as the officer does not exceed the limits set forth in Terry v.
Ohio.88 The Court found, however, that because Officer Rose ex-
ceeded the limits of Terry, the seizure of cocaine from Respondent's
pocket was unconstitutional.8 7
After a brief review of relevant Fourth Amendment precedent,
Justice White determined that the plain view doctrine is analogous
to tactile discoveries of contraband that occur during otherwise law-
ful searches. 88 Adopting the requirements of the plain view doc-
80 State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1991).
81 Id. at 844 n.1.
82 Id. at 844 n.1. The court misquoted Officer Rose's testimony as "I examined it
with my fingers and slid it." Id. at 842.
83 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992).
84 Justice White delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I
and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souterjoined. Justice Scalia filed a concurring
opinion. ChiefJustice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Justices Blackmun and Thomas joined.
85 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993).
86 Id. at 2136 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
87 Id. at 2139.
88 Id. at 2137.
1994]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
trine as enumerated in Horton v. California,89 Justice White
determined that contraband detected through the sense of touch
may be seized without a warrant when an "officer lawfully pats down
a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent." 90
Justice White determined that the seizure of evidence plainly
detected through the sense of touch is justified by the same ration-
ale as the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 91 One
rationale for the plain view doctrine is the theory that no search in-
dependent of the initial lawful intrusion occurs when contraband is
left in open view and is observed from a lawful vantage point.92 A
further justification is the impracticality of requiring an officer to
resort to a neutral magistrate in these circumstances. 93 Justice
White noted that requiring an officer to obtain a search warrant
when contraband presents itself in this manner would do little to
promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. 94 According to
Justice White's analogy, no further invasion of a suspect's privacy
occurs when an officer is performing a lawful pat down of the sus-
pect's clothing and feels an object whose identity as contraband is
immediately apparent. 95 Additionally, Justice White concluded that
the same practical considerations that vindicate warrantless seizure
when contraband is discovered in plain view apply to tactile discov-
eries.96 Although he did not reveal what these practical considera-
tions are, an important concern is the possibility that evidence may
be destroyed or hidden by the time an officer returns with a search
warrant.97
Justice White rejected the Supreme Court of Minnesota's con-
tention that the sense of touch is less immediate and reliable than
sight.98 He pointed out that Terry itself was based upon the supposi-
tion that the sense of touch is capable of revealing the identity of an
object with enough reliability to justify a weapon seizure. 99 Further,
Justice White reasoned that even if tactile sensation is less reliable
89 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
90 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136-37). Jus-
tice White emphasized that under the plain view doctrine, an object may not be seized if





95 Id. at 2138.
96 Id. at 2137.
97 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971).




than sight, that only means that fewer seizures will be justified by
the plain touch doctrine than by the plain view doctrine.100 More-
over, since the Fourth Amendment mandates that officers have
probable cause to believe that an object is contraband before seizing
it, excessively speculative seizures will be prevented.101
The Court also rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's rea-
soning that touch is necessarily more intrusive than sight, remarking
that this concern is inappropriate because the feared intrusion
would already be authorized by Terry.' 0 2 The Court further noted
that "[tlhe seizure of an item whose identity is already known occa-
sions no further invasion of privacy," and that the suspect's privacy
interests are not enhanced by a rule banning the seizure of contra-
band "plainly detected through the sense of touch."' 0 3
In applying the plain touch doctrine to the specific facts of the
Dickerson case, the Court concluded that the seizure was unconstitu-
tional.'0 4 The majority held that Officer Rose overstepped the
strictly limited search for weapons allowed under Terry because his
"continued exploration of Respondent's pocket after having con-
cluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to 'the sole justifi-
cation of the search [under Terry:] .. .the protection of the police
officers and others nearby.' "105 Justice White analogized Officer
Rose's actions to those of the officers in Arizona v. Hicks to conclude
that the officer's continued touching of the suspicious lump in Dick-
erson's pocket constituted a "further search," and was not author-
ized by the plain touch exception.' 0 6 Consequently, the. Court
affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 10 7
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pondered the validity of the
Court's holding in Terry. He focused on the principle that the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures must be interpreted "in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was
adopted."' 08 Applying this principle, he concluded that only the
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2138.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
104 Id. at 2139.
105 Id. at 2138-39 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1967)).
106 Id. at 2139 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)).
107 Id.




"stop" portion of the "stop and frisk" authorized by Terry is valid.10 9
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted it was considered rea-
sonable at common law to stop suspicious individuals and demand
that they "give an account of themselves."' "10 However, Justice
Scalia found precedent only for a full search subsequent to arrest,
not for a physical search of a person temporarily detained.' 1 Nev-
ertheless, because the constitutionality of the frisk itself was not
challenged, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in its
entirety. 112
C. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist' 3 joined in the majority opinion with
respect to the establishment of the plain touch doctrine.' 4 How-
ever, because he believed that the lower courts' findings were im-
precise regarding whether Officer Rose was acting within the
bounds of Terry when "he gained probable cause to believe that the
lump in respondent's jacket was contraband," the Chief Justice
would have vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the majority opinion.1' 5
V. ANALYSIS
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court properly recog-
nized the plain touch doctrine as a constitutional exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. However, this Note ar-
gues that the Court presented an ambiguous, sparse enumeration of
the elements of this newly recognized doctrine. This Note further
contends that the Court improperly affirmed the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision to exclude the crack discovered by Officer
Rose during his patdown of Respondent Dickerson.
A. THE PLAIN TOUCH DOCTRINE IS THE PROPER COROLLARY TO THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The plain touch doctrine is the natural corollary to the plain
view doctrine; the same considerations that led the Court to develop
109 Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 10 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
111 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 2141 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
113 ChiefJustice Rehnquist was joined in this opinion byJustice Blackmun andJustice
Thomas.
114 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2141 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
115 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the plain view doctrine also apply to tactile discoveries. In Coolidge
v. New Hampshire,"16 the Court determined that no further intrusion
on a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights occurs when officers seize
evidence discovered in plain view if the officers remain within the
bounds of the original search."a 7 Allowing seizure of evidence in
plain view does not threaten to turn a narrow search into a general
exploratory search because evidence is not admissible under this
doctrine if officers exceed the limits of the original search." 8 Since
officers invoking the plain touch doctrine must also stay within the
bounds of the original lawful search, this rationale applies equally
well to tactile discoveries of contraband. 19
The practical considerations that justify the plain view doctrine
also justify a plain touch exception. The Coolidge Court permitted
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement because resort
to a neutral magistrate is an unnecessary and impractical inconven-
ience when the character of an object as contraband or evidence of a
crime is already known, and because exclusion of such evidence
does little to enhance the protection provided by the Fourth
Amendment.' 20 These practical considerations also apply to plain
touch seizures. 121 In both plain view and plain touch situations, the
officer would be forced to leave the suspect with the evidence in
order to obtain a warrant. The probability that the evidence would
still be in the location where the officer originally discovered it is
low. The suspect would have a strong motivation to destroy or con-
ceal the evidence upon realizing that the officer has noticed it. One
alternative would be to detain the suspect until a warrant is ap-
proved; however, lengthy detainment without arrest and arraign-
ment is a greater intrusion upon a suspect's rights than seizure of an
object that the officer already has probable cause to believe is con-
traband or evidence of a crime. 122
Further, language used by the Supreme Court in many of the
plain view cases suggests a willingness to extend the plain view doc-
trine to the use of other senses. In a number of these cases, the
Court specifically employed language that implied acceptance of
discoveries based on all senses, instead of confining its decisions to
116 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
117 Id. at 467-68.
118 Id.
119 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
120 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
121 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
122 See Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural and Foreseeable Consequence
ofthe Plain View Doctrine, 95 DICK. L. REv. 521, 532 n.64 (1991); Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits at 22, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
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discoveries based only upon sight. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the
earliest of the plain view cases, the Court noted that "incontrovert-
ible testimony of the senses" may provide probable cause for seizure
of evidence. 123 The possibility of extending the exception to the
use of senses other than sight was also implied in Texas v. Brown, 124
in which the Court referred to the "rule that if, while lawfully en-
gaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a
suspicious object, they may seize it immediately."'' 25 Further, the
Horton Court, borrowing the Coolidge language, reaffirmed that prob-
able cause to seize evidence may be based upon "incontrovertible
testimony of the senses."'126
The Court also specifically implied that the sense of touch can
be relied upon to provide probable cause in Ybarra v. Illinois.a27 In a
footnote, the Ybarra Court suggested that so long as the original
patdown is valid under Terry, officers may seize objects that they
have acquired probable cause to believe are contraband through the
sense of touch. 128 In Ybarra, an officer discovered a cigarette pack
containing narcotics during a patdown. 129 Because the original
patdown was not authorized by Terry, the Court held that the evi-
dence was inadmissible. 130 Implicit in this opinion, as the Dickerson
Court noted, is the Court's willingness to allow the seizure as long
as the patdown is valid, thereby accepting the extension of the plain
view doctrine to cases in which contraband is discovered through
the sense of touch. 13 1 Ybarra is almost identical to the instant case,
which also involved seizure of drugs based upon an officer's tactile
observation of the evidence during a patdown. Unlike Ybarra, how-
ever, the original patdown in Dickerson was authorized by Terry.
Opponents to the plain touch doctrine argue that the plain view
doctrine should not be extended to encompass probable cause
based on touch because touch is more intrusive than sight, 1 3 2 be-
123 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468 (emphasis added).
124 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
125 Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
126 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (emphasis added).
127 444 U.S. 85 (1980).
128 Id. at 93 n.5.
129 Id. at 89.
130 Id. at 92-93. The Court stated "[wje need not decide whether or not the presence
on Ybarra's person of a 'cigarette pack with objects in it' yielded probable cause to be-
lieve Ybarra was carrying any illegal substance." Id. at 93 n.5.
131 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
132 See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992); David L.
Haselkorn, Comment, The Case Against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 54
U. CHi. L. REV. 683, 693-96 (1987); Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16, Min-
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cause establishment of the plain touch doctrine will cause a further
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights,13 3 because people express a
greater expectation of privacy when they carry contraband on their
persons, 3 4 and because touch is less accurate than sight.t35 These
arguments are flawed in many respects.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to accept the
plain touch doctrine because it believed that touch is necessarily
more intrusive than sight.' 36 The court decided that a patdown is
more intrusive than a search of property, because a patdown neces-
sarily entails touching the suspect's body.' 3 7 Because the plain view
doctrine does not typically involve physical contact with the suspect,
while the plain touch doctrine frequently does, some argue that the
two doctrines are distinguishable. However, this argument has little
force, both because the initial intrusion must already be authorized,
and because the plain touch doctrine does not permit the search to
exceed the initial intrusion. The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized that this argument "is inapposite in light of the fact that the
intrusion the [Minnesota Supreme] court fears has already been au-
thorized by the lawful search for weapons."' 38
Second, the concern that the plain touch exception will either
cause a further erosion of Fourth Amendment rights by turning lim-
ited patdown searches into general exploratory searches, or lead to
speculative seizures,' 3 9 is allayed by the requirement that the search
not exceed the bounds of the original justification for the intrusion
without probable cause. Again, since no search not already author-
ized by law is allowed under the plain touch doctrine, no erosion of
Fourth Amendment rights will occur. 140
A third argument is that people express a heightened expecta-
nesota v. Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus
Brief]; Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 28, Dickerson (No. 91-2019).
133 See, e.g., Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 697-702; Respondent's Brief on the Merits
at 42.
134 See, e.g., Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 696; ACLU Amicus Brief at 16; Respon-
dent's Brief on the Merits at 29.
135 See e.g., Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844; People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y.
1993); Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 695; ACLU Amicus Brief at 15; Respondent's Brief
on the Merits at 29-30.
136 Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844. See also supra note 132.
137 Id. at 845.
138 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993).
139 See, e.g., Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 697-702; Respondent's Brief on the Merits
at 42.
140 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. Balanced against the public's right to live in a society
free of drug traffic and drug abuse, a minimal intrusion into a suspect's privacy seems




tion of privacy in objects they carry concealed on their persons. 141
Unlike evidence discovered through sight, evidence discovered dur-
ing a patdown is necessarily discovered on the suspect's person.
Opponents to the plain touch doctrine argue that people have a
greater privacy interest in evidence discovered during a patdown
than in evidence discovered through the sense of sight, because by
concealing it on their person they have exhibited a high expectation
of privacy. 142 This argument ignores the fact that the plain view
doctrine already permits seizure of concealed evidence, so long as
the discovery of that evidence occurred during a valid search. 143
Analysis of the principles developed by the Court in Coolidge
and its progeny demonstrates that the plain view doctrine permits
seizure of evidence found concealed in a drawer, for instance, so
long as the opening of the drawer was authorized by the original
search. 144 A comparable situation occurred in United States v.
Diaz,145 in which an officer lifted the top of a toilet tank in a sus-
pect's home in order to stop the toilet from running. 146 Because the
officer had lawfully gained access to the toilet tank, seizure of the
evidence discovered therein was justified under the plain view doc-
trine.' 47 The suspect obviously exhibited a high expectation of pri-
vacy by placing the evidence in his toilet tank. Arguably, the privacy
expectation in evidence placed in a pocket is no greater than the
privacy expectation in evidence placed in a drawer or a toilet
tank. 148 In both contexts, the suspect has expressed a desire to
shield the object from public view. Consequently, the "expectation
of privacy" argument provides little basis for allowing seizure of evi-
141 See, e.g., Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 696; ACLU Amicus Brief at 16; Respon-
dent's Brief on the Merits at 29.
142 See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1993) ("unlike the item in plain
view in which the owner has no privacy expectation, the owner of an item concealed by
clothing or other covering retains a legitimate expectation that the item's existence and
characteristics will remain private"); Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 696 ("Because the
plain feel cases invariably involve items that are within some form of container, courts
should take account of defendants' demonstrated intent to secrete objects from plain
view when assessing the intrusiveness of a plain feel.").
143 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971).
144 See United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1069 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In their search
for cocaine, the agents were authorized to search any and all areas and items where
narcotic might readily be concealed.").
145 577 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1978).
146 Id. at 822.
147 Id. at 823.
148 Cf. United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 428 (2d Cir. 1981) (arguing that there




dence found concealed in a drawer or toilet tank, but not permitting
seizure of the evidence found in a pocket.
Fourth, the concern that touch is less accurate than sight1 49 is
also misplaced, because the United States Supreme Court already
determined in Terry that "the sense of touch is capable of revealing
the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a
seizure."1 50 Plain logic reveals that if the sense of touch is accurate
enough to reveal the identity of a weapon, it is also accurate enough
to reveal the identity of other contraband that an officer is trained to
recognize. Admittedly, weapons are generally easier to identify by
touch than small pieces of crack cocaine, but officers are able to de-
tect such contraband in many cases because of their experience and
training with these substances. Although the Dickerson Court did not
discuss exactly how an officer becomes trained to recognize various
types of contraband, this concern was addressed in United States v.
Ceballos.151 That court noted that unlike the average individual, of-
ficers deal with contraband continually in their law enforcement du-
ties. This familiarity enables them to recognize contraband upon
tactile contact that lay people might not recognize. 152
Moreover, if tactile observations are generally less reliable than
sight, that only means that fewer seizures will be justified by the
plain touch doctrine. 153 If an officer does not know that an object is
contraband with a sufficient degree of certainty, the officer is not
permitted to seize the evidence.
B. THE SUPREME COURT PROVIDED AMBIGUOUS PARAMETERS FOR
THE PLAIN TOUCH DOCTRINE
In creating the plain touch doctrine, the Court looked to the
three prongs of the plain view test as it has developed from Coolidge
to Horton.154 Based on the analogy to the plain view doctrine, the
Court held that an object can be seized based on tactile observations
149 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d, 840, 844 (Minn. 1992). See also People v.
Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 289, 302 ("the identity and nature of the concealed item cannot be
confirmed until seen"); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 624 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) ("when an individual feels an object through a pants pocket... the sense of touch
is not so definitive"); Haselkorn, supra note 132, at 695 ("A tactile encounter will gener-
ally provide less information than a visual encounter.").
150 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993) (referring to Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
151 719 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
152 Id. at 123-24. As the Ceballos court eloquently stated, "A virtuoso may draw rea-
sonable inferences and suspicions of criminal involvement that would elude the ama-
teur." Id. at 124.
153 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
154 Id. at 2136-37.
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when: (1) a lawful patdown has occurred under Terry; (2) the charac-
ter of the object as contraband or evidence of a crime is "immedi-
ately apparent"; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the
object. 155 However, this decision left a considerable degree of am-
biguity about the specific requirements of the plain touch doctrine.
Simultaneous use of the terms "immediately apparent" and "prob-
able cause" left the holding ambiguous as to what standard of cer-
tainty is necessary to justify seizure. Additionally, the purpose for
the requirement that the officer have a lawful right of access to the
object was not clarified by the Court.
The requirement that the character of the object be immedi-
ately apparent will likely create confusion for courts applying the
plain touch doctrine. 156 The Court did not clarify what it meant by
"immediately apparent" when it relied upon this language from the
Coolidge decision in defining the new doctrine. In its justification of
the new doctrine, the Court also remarked that "seizure of an item
whose identity is already known occasions no further invasion of pri-
vacy."' 57 This particular language should indicate that the plain
touch doctrine can only justify seizure when there is absolutely no
doubt surrounding the identity of the object. However, the Court
implied at another point in the decision that the less imposing prob-
able cause standard is sufficient to justify a plain touch seizure, when
Justice White stated that "[r]egardless of whether the officer detects
contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the
item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively spec-
155 Id. at 2137. An issue that the Court did not address is whether the officer's state of
mind at the time of the search and seizure is relevant. The Coolidge Court originally held
that the discovery of contraband must be inadvertent to fall under the plain view excep-
tion. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971). However, this require-
ment was explicitly overruled in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Because the
Dickerson Court based its construction of the plain touch doctrine on the plain view doc-
trine, it is logical to assume that the Court intended the officer's state of mind to be
irrelevant in the plain touch context.
156 The cases decided since Dickerson have inconsistently interpreted the opinion. See
United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp 1073, 1078-79 (D. Miss. 1993) (holding that the
evidence was inadmissible because there was no "'immediately apparent' determina-
tion" of its identity); United States v. Winter, 826 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (D. Mass. 1993)
(rejecting seizure under the plain touch doctrine because the identity of the evidence
was not immediately apparent); Ohio v. Crawford, No. 64607, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
4488, at * 14 (Oh. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1993) (requiring probable cause for seizure under
the plain touch doctrine). The court completely misread the Dickerson opinion in United
States v. Ross, No. 93-10015-01, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9698, at *9 (D. Kan. June 8,
1993) (stating that the Supreme Court in Dickerson "held that a 'plain feel' exception was
groundless under the Fourth Amendment").




The Court seems to use these phrases interchangeably; how-
ever, they have vastly different implications. While the phrase "im-
mediately apparent" indicates a very strict standard of certainty,
probable cause does not require that the officer conducting the
search know the identity of the object with absolute certainty before
conducting a further search or seizure.' 59 Rather, it requires only
that a reasonable person, given the specific situation and the of-
ficer's experience, would be justified in believing that the object is
contraband or evidence of crime. 160 The Court's haphazard use of
these terms leaves the opinion ambiguous as to what standard of
certainty is required to justify a search or seizure under the plain
touch doctrine.
Probable cause is the proper standard to apply to plain touch
seizures because in formulating the plain touch doctrine, the Court
adopted the requirements of the plain view doctrine. Since the
plain view doctrine requires probable cause to permit seizure 6 , it
is consistent to conclude that probable cause is also sufficient to jus-
tify seizure in the plain touch context. The Coolidge Court created a
similar ambiguity when it held that the character of an object as con-
traband, or evidence- of crime, must be immediately apparent to jus-
tify seizure under the plain view exception, but also mentioned
probable cause in other parts of the decision.' 62 The plain view
cases decided after Coolidge resolved this ambiguity, holding that
probable cause is sufficient to justify either a further search or
seizure of an object.' 63 In Texas v. Brown, 164 the plurality acknowl-
edged that "immediately apparent" was a poor choice of words;
they imply an excessively high degree of certainty as to the identity
of the object. 165 The Court instead determined that probable cause
will justify seizure of evidence discovered in plain view. 166 The
Court has since reaffirmed the probable cause standard in the plain
view context.' 67
158 Id. at 2137 (emphasis added).
159 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
160 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983).
161 Id.
162 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 468 (1971).
163 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
326 (1986); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
164 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
165 Id. at 741.
166 Id. at 742.
167 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1986); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
137 (1990). See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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The probable cause standard is a more practical standard than
the immediately apparent requirement, because officers and courts
are familiar with the requirements of probable cause, and because
probable cause allows officers to rely on their experience and train-
ing when making critical decisions. 168 The Court has been unable
to apply the immediately apparent requirement successfully in the
plain view context, admitting that probable cause is a more func-
tional standard. 169 Because the Court abandoned Coolidge's immedi-
ately apparent standard for the probable cause standard in Brown,
little precedent developed interpreting the scope of the immediately
apparent requirement. Consequently, it would be exceedingly diffi-
cult for courts applying the plain touch doctrine to evaluate the im-
mediacy of an officer's recognition of some object as contraband.
Judges applying this standard will be forced to rely solely on the
officer's testimony that he or she knew immediately upon touching
the object that it was contraband, without guidance from precedent.
Because thought processes cannot be artificially broken down into
consecutive events, it is nearly impossible for anyone to say with
complete certainty whether he or she was "immediately" aware of
the nature of an object. 170 However, well-articulated, familiar stan-
dards exist for the determination of probable cause.
The recent plain view cases, which require that probable cause
be satisfied before seizure, can be looked to for guidance in the
plain touch context. Probable cause was explained in Texas v. Brown:
probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely re-
quires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband
168 The senselessness of requiring a higher standard of certainty than probable cause
in the plain touch context is illuminated by a brief look at the standards for a search
incident to arrest. To make a warrantless arrest, an officer need only have probable
cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is in the process of committing a
crime; after arrest a full blown search of the suspect's person is permissible. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Possession of contraband is a crime. In essence,
therefore, only probable cause is required to search for and seize contraband from a
suspect's person.
Interestingly, a number of earlier cases justified seizure of evidence discovered dur-
ing a patdown as a search incident to arrest, even when the search and seizure of the
evidence occurred prior to the arrest. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 344 P.2d 837 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959); People v. Brown, 305 P.2d 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); State v. Chester, 129
A. 596 (R.I. 1925). It seems irrational to require a stricter standard for seizure under
the plain touch doctrine, since the same result could theoretically be achieved through
manipulation of the search incident to arrest exception.
169 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1986); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741
(1983).
170 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-12, Min-
nesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
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or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not de-
mand that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. 171
Use of this standard is more realistic than requiring that the
identity of the object be immediately apparent. Experienced officers
should be allowed to judge the totality of the circumstances in which
a search occurs. The excessively strict requirement that recognition
of an object as contraband be immediate would not only lead to
confusion in the lower courts, but would most likely render the
newly created plain touch doctrine ineffective, because no room is
given for consideration of the totality of the circumstances, or the
officer's experience. The probable cause standard gives the proper
weight to the experience and intuition that officers rely on in the
daily performance of their official duties, while simultaneously en-
suring that a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights are not unnecessa-
rily intruded upon.172
In its analogy to the plain view doctrine, the Dickerson Court re-
quired that the third prong of the plain view doctrine introduced by
the Horton Court be satisfied. Horton required that an officer have
lawful access to the evidence in order to seize it once the discovery
has been made. 173 Because this was the only reference the Dickerson
Court made to this prong of the plain view test, it is not clear how
this operates in the plain touch setting. The Horton decision does
not provide any insight because it did not define "lawful access,"
nor did it describe what purpose this requirement serves. 174 The
only clue is given in a footnote, which cites a number of pre-Coolidge
cases that dealt with situations in which evidence was held inadmis-
sible because the officers trespassed while seizing the evidence. 175
17' 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
172 See, e.g., Bryant v. United States Treasury Dep't, 903 F.2d 717, 729-30 (9th Cir.
1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) ("The Davis court also emphasized the role that the exper-
tise and special training of the arresting officer plays in the determination of probable
cause. This, of course, makes good sense. We spend billions of dollars providing spe-
cial training for our law enforcement officers. What a waste if we do not rely on it.");
United States v. Packer, 730 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[O]bservation of apparently inno-
cent acts can be significant to a trained officer and ... the officer is entitled to assess
probable cause in light of his experience.").
173 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990).
174 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
175 Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 n.7. (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)
(holding inadmissible evidence seized by officers who detected odor of whiskey mash
and entered defendant's apartment through an open window with landlord's consent,
but without defendant's consent); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (holding
evidence seized by officers who had good cause to believe liquor was illegally distilled in
house inadmissible because officers forced their way into house without a warrant); Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding evidence that officers saw through
window in door inadmissible because they entered through a closed door to seize); Tru-
piano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (holding evidence viewed from outside of
1994] 763
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
There are no subsequent Supreme Court decisions that address this
issue, and lower courts are inconsistent in the application of this
requirement. 176
Synthesis of the cases cited in Horton with the requirements of
the plain view doctrine leads to the rational inference that the lawful
access requirement was imposed to prevent trespass. In other
words, if officers are lawfully conducting a search on a suspect's
property, they can seize evidence observed in plain view without a
warrant specifying the particular evidence, because they have lawful
access to the object.177 However, if officers are conducting a lawful
search on one piece of property and observe contraband in plain
view on the neighboring property, they can not enter the neighbor-
ing property in order to seize the evidence without a warrant,
because to do so would constitute an illegal trespass.178 Conse-
quently, the third prong is not satisfied in the second scenario.
Trespass is not an issue in plain touch situations, however, be-
cause the officer must already be lawfully touching the contraband.
Although the opinion provided no guidance as to how this require-
ment functions in the plain touch context, the Dickerson Court would
not likely have included lawful access among the criteria for seizure
if the Court did not intend it to have some significance. One ra-
tional interpretation is that the Dickerson Court intended the plain
touch doctrine itself to satisfy the third prong of the Horton test. In
other words, this doctrine provides lawful access to an object when
the original search is lawful and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the object is contraband.' 79
bam and seized after officers entered the barn inadmissible); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding evidence inadmissible because officers who smelled burning
opium from hallway entered closed hotel room door in order to seize); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (holding whiskey that officers saw and smelled inadmissible
because they had to enter locked garage in order to seize)).
176 Some lower courts seem to combine the requirement that the initial search be
valid with the requirement that the officer have lawful access to the evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding lawful access
requirement satisfied when evidence discovered during lawful search). However, this
interpretation ignores the fact that Horton distinctly delineated these as two separate
requirements: "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the
object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the
object itself." Horton, 496 U.S. at 137.
177 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971).
178 See Project: 22nd Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 901 n.191 (1993).
179 See, e.g., State v. Crawford, No. 64607, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4488 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 23, 1993). The Crawford Court determined that because the first two prongs




C. THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE PLAIN TOUCH DOCTRINE TO
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
Assuming, arguendo, that "immediately apparent" is the
proper standard, the Court should not have affirmed the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision. Instead, the Court should have re-
manded the case for further proceedings, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist
suggested in his opinion. 18 0 During the trial, Officer Rose re-
counted his discovery of the crack cocaine. 181 He stated that when
he frisked Respondent's chest, he "felt a lump, a small lump, in the
front pocket. [He] examined it with [his] fingers and it slid and it
felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane."' 82 The trial court
did not find that Officer Rose exceeded the scope of Terry when he
conducted this search. t 83 In allowing the seizure, the court found
only that "Officer Rose felt a small, hard object wrapped in plastic in
defendant's pocket."' t8 4 The court further found that "[b]ased upon
his training and experience, Officer Rose formed the opinion that
the object in defendant's pocket was crack/cocaine and removed
it."185
Although nothing in the trial court's findings indicated that Of-
ficer Rose toyed with or manipulated the object in Respondent's
pocket, the Minnesota Supreme Court came to the erroneous con-
clusion that he squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated the object
in Dickerson's pocket in order to determine the identity of the small
lump.' 86 A comparison of the trial transcript to the Minnesota
Supreme Court decision reveals that this conclusion was based on a
misquote of Officer Rose's testimony. In its discussion of the facts,
the Minnesota Supreme Court quoted Officer Rose's testimony as "I
examined it with my fingers and slid it andfelt it to be a lump of crack
cocaine in cellophane."' 187 However, Officer Rose testified that the
object slid, not that he slid the object. 188 He testified that the object
"felt to be" crack cocaine, not that he "felt it."189 Because an officer
is not permitted to exceed the scope of Terry in conducting a
patdown under the plain touch doctrine, the Minnesota Supreme
180 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2141 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
181 Record, supra note 60, at 9.
182 Id.
183 Trial Court Findings, supra note 72.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1991).
187 Id. at 843 (emphasis added).




Court made a critical mistake. Had Officer Rose actively slid the
object, as the Minnesota Supreme Court described, he would have
exceeded the permissible scope of the search for weapons author-
ized by Terry. However, the actual transcript of his testimony indi-
cates that the object slid without any assistance. Therefore, it is
likely that he did not exceed the scope of the original search.
The United States Supreme Court, however, relied solely on
the Minnesota Supreme Court's account of Officer Rose's testimony
when it held that he exceeded the scope of Terry.1 90 The Court
analogized Officer Rose's supposed manipulation of the object to
the actions of the officers in Arizona v. Hicks.' 91 In Hicks, one of the
officers conducting a lawful search noticed some expensive stereo
equipment that he felt was out of place in the "squalid" apart-
ment. 192 Suspecting that it might be stolen, the officer moved some
of the equipment in order to read and record the serial numbers. 193
The Court held that the act of moving the object was a further
search for which the officer must have probable cause under the
plain view doctrine.' 94 Because the state conceded that the officer
did not have probable cause to conduct this further search, the
Court held that the stereo equipment was not admissible under the
plain view doctrine.' 95
The Dickerson Court determined that, like the moving of the
stereo in Hicks, Officer Rose's supposed manipulation of the object
was a further search not authorized by Terry.196 Had the Dickerson
Court examined the trial transcript, it would have realized that it is
not obvious that any of Officer Rose's actions exceeded the man-
dates of Terry. Admittedly, Officer Rose's statement that "I ex-
amined it with my fingers" raises some question as to whether or
not the nature of the object as crack was immediately apparent with-
out further examination. The original proceedings were simply not
focused enough on the actual touching of the object in Dickerson's
pocket to adequately address the issue of whether the identity of the
object was immediately apparent.'9 7 Consequently, the Court
190 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993).
191 Id. at 2139 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1986)).
192 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1986).
193 Id. at 323.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 328.
196 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993). Under Hicks, the further
search requires only probable cause to be valid. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. The Dickerson
opinion, however, apparently required that it be immediately apparent to the officer that
the object is contraband to invoke the plain touch doctrine. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct at 2137.




should have remanded the case for a more complete inquiry into the
events surrounding the search and seizure of the object.
Had the Court truly applied the probable cause standard, Of-
ficer Rose's search of Dickerson's pocket and seizure of the crack
would have been justified by Hicks. As noted above, the Hicks Court
held that a further search is justified under the plain view doctrine
so long as the officer has probable cause to believe it is contra-
band.'98 Considering the Court's reliance on Hicks, 199 and its anal-
ogy to the plain view doctrine,2 00 a further search should
accordingly be permissible under the plain touch doctrine so long as
the officer has probable cause. Under this theory, the issue of
whether Officer Rose manipulated the object in Respondent's
pocket is irrelevant, because it can be characterized as a "further
search" that is permissible under the plain touch doctrine, so long
as the officer has probable cause to believe the object is contraband
before searching further.
When Officer Rose discovered the lump in Respondent's
pocket, he had probable cause to believe it was contraband. Prob-
able cause is a flexible standard which allows an officer to draw upon
the available facts and his own experience when determining
whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would
believe that an object is contraband. 201 Probable cause does not re-
quire that the officer's conclusion be accurate, or even more likely
true than false.202 Because Officer Rose saw Respondent coming
out a building commonly known as a crack house, because Respon-
dent behaved evasively upon noticing the marked squad car and
making eye contact with the officers, and because Officer Rose had
extensive experience in feeling crack through clothing, Officer Rose
had probable cause to believe that the small lump wrapped in cello-
phane in Respondent's pocket was crack before any further exami-
nation of the lump occurred. Consequently, any manipulation of
the object that may have occurred before its seizure is justified as a
further search permissible under Hicks.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Dickerson Court's decision to allow seizure of an object
based on the sense of touch is a logical extension of the plain view
doctrine. The Court properly relied on the requirements of the
198 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326.
199 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
200 Id.




plain view doctrine in delineating the plain touch doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, the Dickerson decision left a number of ambiguities. The
Court demanded that an officer have lawful access to an object
before seizing that object under the plain touch doctrine. However,
the Court did not explain how this requirement functions in the
plain touch context. More importantly, the decision is not clear
about which standard of certainty, probable cause or immediately
apparent, must be satisfied to justify seizure under the plain touch
doctrine. These ambiguities may lead to confusion in the lower
courts as judges throughout the country attempt to abide by this
new doctrine.
Additionally, the Court relied on a misquote of Officer Rose's
testimony in determining that the seizure in the instant case was im-
permissible. Because the trial court's findings were not focused
enough on the events surrounding the actual touching of the crack
in Respondent's pocket to determine whether it was immediately
apparent that it was crack, and because the Minnesota Supreme
Court made a critical mistake when it quoted Officer Rose's testi-
mony, the Court should have remanded the case for a more com-
plete investigation of Officer Rose's actions. However, had the
Court properly applied the probable cause standard, any manipula-
tion of the object in Dickerson's pocket would have been acceptable
as a further search.
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